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From Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority
to AIDS: What is in the Future for
Homosexual Aliens?
Jorge L. Carro*
Homosexual aliens may be denied entry into the United States
based solely on their sexual preference. This Article attempts to
trace the evolution of American immigration policy regarding the
exclusion of homosexual aliens. It first discusses and compares the
historical treatment of homosexuals in the United States and
abroad. It then considers United States immigration policy, focus-
ing on how the immigration laws have dealt, and should deal, with
homosexuality. Finally, it discusses the AIDS virus and the influ-
ence it has had upon public perception of homosexuality. In this
controversial area, this Article attempts to develop a more coherent
and rational policy regarding the exclusion of homosexual aliens
than the practice that currently exists.'
L Public Attitudes Toward and Treatment of Homosexuals
Nations vary tremendously in their treatment of homosexuals.
Public attitudes toward homosexuals in the United States shape
their treatment in immigration law and policy.
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. I acknowledge the in-
valuable contribution of Michael G. Schinner as well as the assistance of Lisa Arnett,
Daniel J. Penn, and Sohaib Qadar-all members of the U.C. College of Law Class of
1989.
1. The scope of this article is limited to the exclusion of homosexual aliens. "Exclu-
sion" in immigration law refers to the process of preventing aliens from making a formal
entry into the country. T. Aleinikoff & D. Martin, Immigration: Process and Policy 19
(1985). "Deportation," often referred to as expulsion, "means the removal of aliens
already within the United States." Id. The Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), clearly established Congress's plenary power to ex-
clude aliens from the United States. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893), augmented that power with the power of deportation. Justice Gray, writing for
the majority, stated: "The power to exclude aliens and the power to expel them rest
upon one foundation, are derived from one source, are supported by the same reasons,
and are in truth but parts of one and the same power." Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713.
Nonetheless, this Article considers only the issues surrounding the exclusion of homo-
sexual aliens. Once the problem regarding the exclusion of homosexual aliens has been
resolved, the means of resolving the controversy regarding the deportation of homosex-
ual aliens should become clearer.
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A. Treatment of Homosexuals in the United States
Public perception of homosexuality in the United States is a prod-
uct of diverse religious and cultural influences. While public per-
ception of homosexuality has changed dramatically since colonial
times, our legal system has lagged behind. At one time, either
through common law or by statute, every state in the union
criminalized sodomy.2 Most states, in very Blackstonian language,
characterized homosexuality as "sinful, sick and criminal," a crime
"not fit to be named."3 For example, the original North Carolina
sodomy statute read: "Any person who shall commit the abominable
and detestable crime against nature, not fit to be named among
Christians .... shall be adjudged guilty of a felony and shall suffer
death without the benefit of clergy." 4
The prohibition against homosexual behavior, whether express or
through sodomy statutes, continued in all fifty states and in the Dis-
trict of Columbia until the early 1960s. 5 In 1961, by adopting the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code provision excluding
adult, private, consensual, sexual practices from its list of acts sub-
ject to criminal sanctions, Illinois became the first state to
decriminalize private, consensual sodomy between adults.6
Not until the penal reforms of the 1970s did legislators in other
states finally begin to decriminalize private, consensual homosexual
conduct. 7 To this day, 25 states8 and the District of Columbia9 con-
tinue to classify as criminals individuals who engage in homosexual
2. Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Ac-
tivity, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 521, 523 (1986).
3. Id. at 524.
4. Id. at 526 (quoting N.C. Rev. Code ch. 34, § 6 (1837)).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 526 (citing Crim. Code of 1961, §§ 11-2, 11-3, 1961 Ill. Laws 1985-2006
(codified as amended at Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 11-2, 1 l-3)(Smith-Hurt 1979 & Supp.
1983)). "In supporting the decriminalization of sodomy, the American Law Institute
(ALI) noted that such nations as France, Great Britain, Canada, Mexico, Italy, Denmark,
and Sweden had repealed their sodomy statutes. The ALI further cited scientific studies
that found homosexual conduct to be neither 'unnatural' nor socially harmful." Id. (cit-
ing Model Penal Code § 207.5 comment 276, at 278 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1955)).
7. Some states have extended to homosexuals protection from any discrimination by
recognizing an affirmative right to be free from discrimination based on "sexual orienta-
tion" or "sexual preference." See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7 (West 1988). Nevertheless,
despite its decriminalization in some states, homosexuality is still grounds for restrictive
treatment under many state laws. For example, it may be grounds for divorce, denial of
child adoption or custody, denial of massagist license, denial/annulment of corporation
charter, denial of alcohol license, denial of foster family license, and denial of casino
license, and is a cause of action for legal separation of husband and wife.
8. Ala. Code § 13A-6-65 (1982) (punished as Class A misdemeanor); Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 13-1411 (Supp. 1985) (punished as Class 3 misdemeanor); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-
1813 (1977) (punished as Class A misdemeanor); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 800.02 (West 1976)
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activity. Of these twenty-five states, sixteen classify sodomy as a fel-
ony, and nine consider it to be a misdemeanor. In 1988, a typical
statute still read: "Sodomy and Buggery: Whoever commits the
abominable and detestable crime against nature, either with man-
kind or with a beast shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for not more than twenty years."' 10
The federal government continues to discriminate against homo-
sexuals, although it has made several improvements in the situation
of homosexuals as federal employees."I For example, homosexuals
are often denied security clearance and cannot, therefore, seek em-
ployment with executive agencies like the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), or the De-
partment of State, or with any private employer engaged in defense
contract work. 12 Moreover, elimination of homosexuals from the
military has been an official policy of the United States government
since 1943.13
(punished as 2d degree misdemeanor); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1984) (punished as
felony: prison sentence between 1 and 20 years); Idaho Code § 18-6605 (1987) (prison
term of 5 years or more); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3505 (1981) (punished as Class B misde-
meanor); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.100 (Baldwin 1978) (punished as Class A misde-
meanor); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14.89 (West 1986) (fine of $2,000 or less and/or 5 year
prison term or less); Md. Ann. Code §§ 553, 554 (1987) (sentence in penitentiary for 10
years or less and/or fine of up to $1,000); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 34-35 (Law. Co-
op. 1980) (prison sentence of 20 years or less); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.158 (West
1968) (prison term of 1 day to life); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.293 (West 1987) (prison
term of 1 year or less/fine of $3,000 or less); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-59 (1972) (im-
prisonment in penitentiary for 10 years or less); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 566.090 (Vernon
1979) (Class A misdemeanor); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-505 (1985) (prison term of 10
years or less and/or fine of $50,000 or less); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.190 (1985) (prison
term between 1 and 6 years); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 (1988) (Class H felony); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983) (imprisonment in penitentiary for term of 10 years
or less); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-10-1 (1981) (prison term between 7 and 20 years); S.C.
Code Ann. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (imprisonment in penitentiary for term of 5
years and/or fine of $500 or more); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-612 (1982) (imprisonment
in penitentiary for term of 5 to 15 years); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06 (Vernon 1974)
(punished as Class C misdemeanor); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 (Supp. 1988) (pun-
ished as Class B misdemeanor); Va. Code Ann. § 1802-361 (1988) (punished as Class 6
felony).
9. D.C. Code Ann. § 22-3502 (1981) (prison term of 10 years or less or fine of
$1,000 or less).
10. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 34 (Law. Co-op. 1980).
11. See Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 Drake L. Rev.
311, 317 (1980-1981).
12. See Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law In the Mid-Eighties, Part II, 11
U. Dayton L. Rev. 275, 275-76 (1986).
13. Id. at 287. Contra, Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988)
(striking down army regulation barring homosexuals as violative of equal protection
clause), reh'g en banc granted, 847 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1988).
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The United States Supreme Court has given its support to this
policy of discrimination. In Bowers v. Hardwick, one of the most con-
troversial decisions of the past decade, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy law similar to the statute
quoted above.' 4 Decided in 1986, following numerous Supreme
Court decisions expanding the constitutional right to privacy,' 5 Bow-
ers effectively put a halt to this development and, in fact, signaled a
retreat.
The Bowers case involved the constitutionality of a Georgia statute
that criminalized consensual sodomy.' 6 In upholding the statute,
the Court stated that fundamental liberties are those "deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition."'17 Whereas the Court found
family, marriage, and procreation to be deeply rooted liberties, it
found that the right to engage in homosexual conduct was not.' 8
Indeed, the Court noted, "proscriptions against [sodomy] have an-
cient roots."' 9
Hardwick, in turn, argued that "majority sentiments about the
morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate" and that
the right to engage in any type of private consensual sexual activity
should be constitutionally safeguarded. 20 The Court concluded,
14. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Georgia statute considered in Bowers provided in per-
tinent part that:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another....
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprison-
ment for not less than one nor more than 20 years....
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1984).
15. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. Michael Hardwick was arrested in 1985 for violating this statute when an Atlanta
police officer, who had entered Hardwick's home on an unrelated matter, observed
Hardwick through a partially open bedroom door engaging in an act of homosexual
sodomy. Although Hardwick was arrested and charges were filed, the District Attorney
decided not to pursue the case. Hardwick brought suit against Michael Bowers, Attor-
ney General for the State of Georgia, and several other defendants, seeking to have the
Georgia sodomy statute declared unconstitutional. Hardwick asserted that the statute
placed him in imminent danger of arrest because he was a practicing homosexual who
regularly engaged in private acts of sodomy. See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202,
1204 (11th Cir. 1985).
17, Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)).
18. The Court, after surveying cases in which the fourteenth amendment was found
to confer a fundamental individual right with regard to decisions relating to family, mar-
riage, and procreation, went on to state that "[n]o connection between family, marriage,
or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demon-
strated .... Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
19. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
20. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
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however, that the "presumed belief of the electorate in Georgia that
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable" provides a
rational basis for the challenged law. 2 1 In essence, the Court pre-
served the majoritarian view of the morality of homosexuality at the
expense of the minority's right to privacy. Unfortunately, the Court
skillfully ignored the reality that if majoritarian notions always pre-
vail, advances in the area of civil rights will be illusory.
B. Treatment of Homosexual Aliens in Other Countries
Nations have reacted in very different ways to homosexuals. In
most western European and Latin American countries, a private ho-
mosexual act between consenting adults is neither a civil nor a crim-
inal offense. 22 In contrast, the majority of African nations impose
severe penalties on individuals caught engaging in homosexual
acts. 23
Anglo-Saxon legal systems have shifted to a middle position to-
ward homosexuality.2 4 In England, for instance, homosexuality his-
torically fell within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts along
with such other crimes as blasphemy, heresy, witchcraft and adul-
tery.2 5 Those found to have engaged in homosexual acts were pros-
ecuted as heretics and burned at the stake.26 In 1533, the first
secular statute proscribing acts of homosexuality was enacted. 27
Under the Act, persons convicted of sodomy suffered "pains of
death." 28 Although the penalty was later reduced to servitude for
life under the Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861, sodomy was
still termed "the infamous crime against nature."' 29 After a series of
debates between ecclesiastical and secular authorities, England
decriminalized homosexual conduct under the Sexual Offenses Act
21. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
22. F. Whitam & R. Mathy, Male Homosexuality in Four Societies: Brazil, Guate-
mala, the Philippines, and the United States 129-40 (1986). There are a few countries in
these regions, however, that do criminalize such behavior. See, e.g., The Austrian Penal
Act 64 (N. West & S. Shuman trans. 1966) (1-5 years in prison); The Columbian Penal
Code 94-95 (P. Eder ed. 1967) (6 months to 2 years in prison).
23. See, e.g., R. Seidman, A Sourcebook of the Criminal Law in Africa 75 (1966)
(Nigeria treats sodomy as a felony carrying a 14 year prison term). M. Ganzglass, The
Penal Code of the Somali Democratic Republic 456-57 (1971) (Somalia treats sodomy as
a felony carrying a 3 month to 3 year prison term).
24. See F. Whitam & R. Mathy, supra note 22, at 130 table 6.1.
25. See W. Barnett, Sexual Freedom and the Constitution 80-81 (1973).
26. D. Bailey, Homosexuality and the Western Christian Tradition 146-47 (1955).
27. See id. (quoting 25 Hen. 8, ch. 6 (1533) (repealed by 9 Geo. 4, ch. 31 (1828))).
28. Id.
29. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *215.
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of 1967.30 The current law permits private, consensual homosexual
behavior between parties 21 years of age or older.31
An important contribution to the development of European law
regarding homosexual acts was the decision of the European Com-
mission of Human Rights in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, adopted on
March 13, 1980.32 In his application to the Commission, Mr. Dudg-
eon, age 30, of Northern Ireland, complained of the existence of
laws in force in his country that made illegal certain sexual acts be-
tween members of the same sex. 33 He alleged that these laws vio-
lated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
which guarantees an individual "the right to respect for his private
. . . life." 3 4 The Commission found that "the legal prohibition of
private homosexual acts between consenting males over 21 years of
age breached the applicant's rights under Article 8 of the
Convention." 35
II. The General Policy and Development
of United States Immigration Law
Some individuals maintain that the right to move from one coun-
try to another is absolute. 36 However, while it is generally accepted
among democratic states that individuals are free to leave the coun-
try in which they reside, states are under no obligation to receive
aliens unless a treaty mandates otherwise. If a state exercises its
sovereign power to admit an alien to its territory, it is free to create
the terms and conditions upon which entry is based.3 7
States may protect themselves from undesirable aliens by exclud-
ing certain classes of individuals from their countries. Aliens may be
30. See Comment, Bowers v. Hardwick: Balancing the Interests of the Moral Order
and Individual Liberty, 16 Cumb. L. Rev. 555, 559-60 (1986); see alsoJ. Smith & B. Ho-
gan, Criminal Law 443 (5th ed. 1983). The English Parliament enacted the statute
based upon the recommendations of the English government's Committee on Homo-
sexual Offenses and Prostitution. See Comment, supra, at 559-60. Shortly after the Sex-
ual Offenses Act was passed, many of the Commonwealth nations followed the lead of
their mother country and enacted similar legislation: Wales in 1967, Canada in 1969,
Scotland in 1980, and Northern Ireland in 1982. See F. Whitam & R. Mathy, supra note
22, at 136.
31. See J. Smith & B. Hogan, supra note 30, at 443.
32. Eur. Comm'n H.R., Application No. 7525/76 (1980).
33. Id. at 1.
34. Id. at 1, 26.
35. Id. at 36.
36. A. Dowty, Closed Borders 7 (1987).
37. See 1 L. Oppenheim, International Law 675-76 (8th ed. 1957); I. Brownlie, Prin-
ciples of Public International Law 519 (3d ed. 1979).
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excluded for health reasons,38 for political reasons, for national se-
curity reasons,39 or for economic reasons. States also use their im-
migration power to give preference in the admission process to
certain occupational groups or highly skilled individuals, or for hu-
manitarian reasons. The United States, for example, has welcomed
refugees from Cambodia, the "boatpeople," who were forced to flee
their homeland following the Vietnam War because of persecution
they experienced under Cambodia's communist regime.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that " 'over no con-
ceivable subject is the Legislative power of Congress more complete
than it is over' the admission of aliens." 40 Once Congress has de-
cided to exclude aliens possessing certain characteristics, the Court,
without exception, has sustained its plenary power to regulate this
area of immigration law. 4'
Use of this power has led to discriminatory immigration practices.
Despite the legal entry of nearly 100 million aliens during the past
century, 42 the United States' borders remain impenetrable to vari-
ous groups. For years the nation's immigration law was designed to
preserve the ethnic status quo, a concept known as "nativism." 43
Americans feared and disliked new immigrants, considering them
inherently and biologically inferior. For example, Edward Ross, a
leading academic proponent of nativism, considered Jews to be "un-
dersized and weak muscled... and exceedingly sensitive to pain." 44
Of Italians, he wrote, "[Italians] possess a distressing frequency of
low foreheads, open mouths, weak chins, poor features, skewed
faces, small or knobby crania and backless heads." 45 Still others
38. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6), (g) (1952) (excluding aliens afflicted with danger-
ous contagious diseases).
39. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (28), (29), (33) (1982) (denying admission to anar-
chists, communists, individuals connected with the Nazi regime, terrorists and spies).
40. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (citing Oceanic Navigation Co.
v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 334 (1909)).
41. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. 753. The United States Constitution does not specifically
delegate to the federal government the power to regulate immigration. Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court has held that Congress's power to regulate immigration may be im-
plied from those provisions of the Constitution governing the regulation of foreign
commerce, declarations of war, and treaty and naturalization powers. See Comment,
Reevaluating Alien Exclusion in Light of AIDS, 6 Dick.J. Int'l L. 119, 122-23 (1987); see
also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (permitting Congress to establish uniform rule of
naturalization).
42. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Immigrants: How
Many?, Staff Report 28 (1980), reprinted in T. Aleinikoff & D. Martin, supra note 1, at 60.
43. This concept was advocated by groups such as the Know-Nothing Party, which
advocated eliminating even naturalized immigrants from participation in the political
process. See T. Aleinikoff & D. Martin, supra note 1, at 43.
44. Id. at 44.
45. Id.
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considered Jews to be "clever thieves" who were "filthy, un-Ameri-
can, and often dangerous in their habits"; Russians were the "red
menace"; the conquered Germans were the "bestial hordes"; and
Chinese were "inferior to any race God ever made . . . hav[ing] no
souls to save, and if they [did], they [were] not worth saving. ' 46
Ross concluded that the new immigrants in general were undesir-
able because they "[were] beaten men from beaten races, represent-
ing the worst failures in the struggle for existence." 47 One report
stated, "Abraham Lincoln's fear that when nativists gained control
of U.S. policy they would rewrite the Declaration of Independence
to read: 'All men are created equal except Negroes, and foreigners,
and Catholics' seemed to be coming true."'48
The efforts of this nation's first Catholic president, John F. Ken-
nedy, marked the turning point in the history of United States immi-
gration policy. As President, Kennedy introduced legislation to
abolish the 40 year old national origins quota system. 49 The time
was ripe for change: stimulated by the civil rights movement, Con-
gress welcomed Kennedy's proposal to liberalize immigration pol-
icy. Kennedy's assassination in 1963 prevented him from witnessing
the culmination of his efforts, the passage of the Immigration and
Nationality Act Amendments of 1965. The Amendments abolished
the national origins formula and heralded a new era in United States
immigration policy. They also brought this country one step closer
to George Washington's vision of the United States as "an asylum to
the oppressed and the needy of the earth." 50 Although groups from
nearly every race, creed, religion, and culture benefited from the
new and liberal immigration policy, homosexuals remained barred
from entry.
III. Homosexual Aliens and Immigration Law
Homosexual aliens were first excluded from entry into the United
States by the Immigration Act of 1917, based on the belief held by
the medical and psychiatric communities that homosexuality was a
disease. 5' Under the 1917 Act, individuals who were certified by an
46. Id. at 45, 50.
47. Id. at 45.
48. Id. at 51.
49. The quota system was a numerical control device implemented by Congress
based on the nationality of the individuals. It was intended to restrict immigration from
disfavored regions by assigning a preestablished percentage to some nations while com-
pletely excluding others.
50. T. Aleinikoff & D. Martin, supra note 1, at 51.
51. Pub. L. No. 64-301, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875 (1917).
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examining physician as "mentally defective" or afflicted with a "con-
stitutional psychopathic inferiority" were denied admission into the
country.52 For years, both the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS) and the Public Health Service (PHS) classified homosex-
ual aliens as psychopathic inferiors or mental defectives. 53
Although medical and societal attitudes toward homosexuality have
since changed, 54 the immigration statutes pertaining to the exclu-
sion of homosexuals have not been altered in any substantive way. 55
Various federal courts of appeals have interpreted the same statutes
with conflicting results, thus adding to the controversy and confu-
sion in this area. This section analyzes some of the most significant
decisions.
A. Case Law on the Exclusion of Homosexual Aliens
The statutory provision authorizing the exclusion of aliens af-
flicted with psychopathic personalities has often been used to justify
the exclusion of homosexuals. The first major case addressing the
applicability of the psychopathic personality categorization to the
exclusion of homosexuals was United States v. Flores-Rodriguez. 56 Flo-
res-Rodriguez had been convicted of perjury for failing to disclose
in a sworn application for an immigration visa that he had been con-
victed of loitering in a public place for the purpose of soliciting
men. On appeal, Flores-Rodriguez asserted that his false statement
was immaterial because disclosure of his conviction would not have
affected his visa application under the existing immigration law.
The court of appeals disagreed. Based on the 1917 Immigration
Act, which was then in force, the court held that Flores-Rodriguez
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., In re La Rochelle, 11 1. & N. Dec. 436 (BIA 1965) (holding that homo-
sexuality comes within meaning of constitutional psychopathic inferiority).
54. The American Psychiatric Association in 1973 removed homosexuality from the
class of mental disorders known as "sexual deviation." The American Psychological As-
sociation, the American Public Health Association, the American Nurses Association,
and the Council of Advanced Practitioners in Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing of
the American Nurses' Association have since endorsed this position. Memorandum
from Julius Richmond, Surgeon General and Assistant Secretary for Health, United
States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to William Foege and George
Lythcott (Aug. 2, 1979), reprinted in 56 Interpreter Releases 398-99 (1979).
55. Since the 1917 Act, the term "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" has been
modified to "psychopathic personality," and the term "sexual deviation" has been ad-
ded. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982).
56. 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956).
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could have been excluded either as a person of "constitutional psy-
chopathic inferiority" or as "mentally defective." 57 While the gov-
ernment failed to present any evidence that homosexuals were
included in the category of "constitutional psychopathic inferi-
ority," the court concluded that the defendant's professed homo-
sexuality and conviction were "evidence of homosexual tendencies
of an extremely offensive exhibitionistic nature" and may have been
enough to put him in the psychopathic category.58 Furthermore,
the court concluded that the term "mentally defective" encom-
passed more than intellectual capacity; it was "designed to exclude
homosexuals with exhibitionistic tendencies and other groups with
lewd proclivities similarly repugnant to the mores of our society." 59
In 1952, the language "persons of constitutional psychopathic in-
feriority" was replaced with the language "afflicted with psycho-
pathic personality." 60  The applicability of this category to
homosexuals was first tested in 1961 in Quiroz v. Neelly. 61 Quiroz in-
volved the deportation of a Mexican woman who was found to be
afflicted with a psychopathic personality based upon evidence of her
homosexuality. Despite the testimony of two doctors that homosex-
uals were not necessarily considered psychopathic personalities by
the medical profession, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found this language applicable to homosexuals. The court con-
cluded from the legislative history of the act that "[w]hatever the
phrase 'psychopathic personality' may mean to the psychiatrist, to
the Congress it was intended to include homosexuals and sex
perverts."62
Within a year, however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
rendered a conflicting decision in Fleuti v. Rosenberg.63 Fleuti was a
Swiss national who had been lawfully admitted to the United States
as a permanent resident in 1952. He remained in this country con-
tinuously until 1956, when he traveled to Ensenada, Mexico, "for a
57. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d at 411.
58. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d at 410.
59. Flores-Rodrguez, 237 F.2d at 411.
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982). The term "sexual deviation" was not included in
the Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act of 1952. Nonetheless, the ab-
sence of the term "sexual deviation" was "not to be construed in any way as modifying
the intent to exclude all aliens who [were] sexual deviates. The provision for the exclu-
sion of aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality or a mental defect ... [was] suffi-
ciently broad to provide for the exclusion of homosexuals and sex perverts." S. Rep.
No. 1137, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1951).
61. 291 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1961).
62. Quiroz, 291 F.2d at 907.
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few hours." 64 Three years later, the INS sought to deport Fleuti on
the ground that at the time of his return in 1956, he "was within one
or more of the classes of aliens excludable by laws existing at the
time of such entry." 65 Specifically, the Service alleged that Fleuti
was an alien afflicted with a psychopathic personality based on evi-
dence of his homosexual tendencies and homosexual activities.
66
The district court upheld the deportation order.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit voided' the
alien's deportation order on the grounds that the phrase "psycho-
pathic personality" was too vague to give notice that homosexuals
were included in this group; nowhere in the statute was the term
"psychopathic personality" defined. The court concluded that the
statute violated Fleuti's right to due process as guaranteed by the
fifth amendment. 67
In response to the Fleuti decision, Congress amended the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act in 1965 to provide that persons afflicted
with "sexual deviation" would be excluded from entering the
United States.68 Nonetheless, confusion surrounded the use of the
phrase "psychopathic personality" to exclude homosexual aliens.
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court sought to clarify the law
in Boutilier v. I.N.S.69 Clive Boutilier was a Canadian national who
was admitted to the United States as a permanent resident on June
22, 1955, at the age of 21.7o Several years later, Boutilier applied
for citizenship. On the affidavit he submitted to the naturalization
64. Fleuti, 302 F.2d at 653.
65. Fleuti, 302 F.2d at 653.
66. The INS alleged that Fleuti had "been afflicted with the desire for sexual rela-
tions with members of [his] own sex for approximately twenty-two (22) years, [and had]
indulged in the practice of sexual relations with members of [his] own sex at periodic
intervals, averaging about once a month for the past twenty-two (22) years." Fleuti, 302
F.2d at 654 n.3.
67. Fleuti, 302 F.2d at 658.
68. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 919 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982)). The INA had previously provided in pertinent part that:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following classes of aliens shall
be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the
United States:
(4) Aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental defect.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1964). After the amendment in 1965, the statute read:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following classes of aliens shall
be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the
United States:
(4) Aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality, sexual deviation, or a mental
defect.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982).
69. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
70. Boutilier, 363 F.2d 488, 490 (1966).
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examiner, Boutilier admitted that he had once been arrested on a
charge of sodomy. 71 In a subsequent affidavit, Boutilier revealed
the full history of his sexually deviant behavior. 72 Based on this
document, the PHS issued a certificate stating that Boutilier "was
afflicted with a class A condition, namely, psychopathic personality,
sexual deviate, at the time of his admission to the United States." 73
Armed with this certificate, the government initiated deportation
proceedings. Based on the undisputed evidence of Boutilier's ho-
mosexuality the special inquiry officer ordered Clive Boutilier de-
ported. He wrote, "Boutilier had been a homosexual at the time of
entering the United States and, thus, was excludable as one afflicted
with a 'psychopathic personality.' 7,74
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
"whether the term 'psychopathic personality' included homosexuals
and if it suffered illegality because of vagueness." 75 After reviewing
the history of the Act, the Court concluded that the phrase "psycho-
pathic personality" was not used in the clinical sense in the statute,
but as a term of art by which the Congress intended to "effectuate
its purpose to exclude from entry all homosexuals and other sex
perverts."' 76 Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the
term was void for vagueness. The Court reasoned that "[t]he con-
stitutional requirement of fair warning has no applicability to stan-
dards . . . for admission of aliens to the United States" because
Congress has plenary power to exclude persons with characteristics
that Congress has forbidden.77 This decision, in conjunction with
the 1965 amendment, left no doubt that the United States' borders
were closed to homosexuals.
Medical advances, however, led to a 1979 PHS policy change re-
garding the treatment of homosexual aliens'. Before 1979, INS per-
sonnel who suspected an alien of homosexuality referred the
individual to the PHS for an examination.78 If PHS medical officers
determined that the alien was a homosexual, the alien was excluded
under a Class A medical certificate. 79 In 1979, however, following a
71. Boutilier, 363 F.2d at 490.
72. Boutilier, 363 F.2d at 490-91.
73. Boutilier, 363 F.2d at 491.
74. Boutilier, 363 F.2d at 491.
75. Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 120.
76. Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 122.
77. Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 123.
78. Hill v. I.N.S., 714 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1976
& Supp. V 1981)).
79. Hill, 714 F.2d at 1472 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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proclamation by the American Psychiatric Association that it no
longer considered homosexuality a mental disease, the Surgeon
General of the United States ordered its personnel not to issue
Class A certificates excluding aliens solely because those aliens were
suspected of being homosexual. 80 The reasons given for the policy
change were that the medical profession no longer considered ho-
mosexuality per se to be a mental disorder, and that homosexuality
was not properly determined through a physical examination.8'
Following this development, the INS allowed homosexuals to
enter the country conditionally under parole status until its legal
counsel in the Justice Department could provide further guidance. 82
The Justice Department found that the Surgeon General's discre-
tion with regard to medical determinations was limited by congres-
sional intent to prohibit the entry of homosexuals, 83 and advised the
INS to continue its practice of denying homosexual aliens admission
to the United States. 84
In response to this advice, the INS initiated a new procedure re-
garding the inspection of aliens who were suspected of being homo-
sexuals. 85 Under the new procedure, unless an arriving alien made
an "unambiguous oral or written admission of homosexuality" or a
third person arriving at the same time "voluntarily state[d], without
prompting or prior questioning, that an alien who arrived in the
United States at the same time . .. [was] a homosexual," the alien
was not to be questioned about his or her sexual preference. 86 If,
however, the arriving alien volunteered the information or a third
party arriving at the same time identified the alien as a homosexual,
the alien would then become excludable. 87 This new policy was first
tested in Hill v. LN.S. 88
Hill wanted to enter the country as a nonimmigrant visitor.89 Be-
cause Hill made an unsolicited statement that he was a homosexual
80. 56 Interpreter Releases 387 (1979). The American Psychiatric Association
adopted a resolution on December 15, 1973, declaring that "homosexuality per se im-
plies no. impairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational
capabilities." D. Knutson, Homosexuality and the Law 21 n.42 (1980).
81. 56 Interpreter Releases 387-88 (1979).
82. Hill, 714 F.2d at 1473 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
83. Hill, 714 F.2d at 1473 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
84. 57 Interpreter Releases 440, 441-42 (1980).
85. Hill, 714 F.2d at 1473 (citing 57 Interpreter Releases 440 (1980)).
86. Hill, 714 F.2d at 1473 (citing 57 Interpreter Releases 440 (1980))..
87. Hill, 714 F.2d at 1473 (citing 57 Interpreter Releases 440 (1980)).
88. 714 F.2d 1470.
89. Hill, 714 F.2d at 1473.
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to an INS official upon entry, he was subjected to an exclusion hear-
ing. At the exclusion hearing, however, the immigration judge
ruled that Hill was not excludable because the government could
not present a medical certificate stating that Hill was afflicted with a
sexual deviation or mental defect, as required by the statute.90 The
INS appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which re-
versed the decision.9' The BIA reasoned that the applicant in an
exclusion hearing had the burden of proving his admissibility, and
where the applicant had made an unsolicited statement that he was a
homosexual, no medical certificate was necessary to exclude him.92
Hill petitioned the Federal District Court for the Northern District
of California for a writ of habeas corpus. 93 The court granted the
writ and permitted Hill to enter the country, basing its holding on
legislative history indicating that Congress intended the exclusion
of homosexuals to be a medical exclusion.94 Thus, under the stat-
ute, a medical certificate was required to exclude even declared
homosexuals. 95 The court further reasoned that if homosexuality
was a medical exclusion, and the medical profession no longer con-
sidered homosexuality to be a medical illness, mental disorder, or
sexual deviation, the congressional intention to exclude homosexu-
als no longer existed.9 6 The court distinguished Boutilier and found
that it was not controlling where medical authorities had not merely
changed the label applied to homosexuality, but had determined
that homosexuality was not an illness. 97 Thus, the court concluded
that "Boutilier does not preclude the Court from finding that Con-
gress did not intend that homosexuals be excluded from entry into
the United States solely because they are homosexuals once medical
authorities have determined that homosexuality is not a medical ill-
ness, mental disorder, or sexual deviation." 98 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision that a medical certificate
is necessary for exclusion where such exclusion is based on medical
90. In re Hill, 18 I. & N. Dec. 81, 82 (BIA 1981).
91. Id. at 81.
92. Id. at 85-86.
93. Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm. v. I.N.S., 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
94. Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., 541 F. Supp. at 577.
95. Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., 541 F. Supp. at 579.
96. Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm.; 541 F. Supp. at 584.
97. Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., 541 F. Supp. at 584.
98. Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., 541 F. Supp. at 585.
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reasons, but did not reach the issue of whether Congress had in-
tended a per se exclusion of homosexuals independent of medical
reasons .99
Shortly after the Hill decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reached the opposite conclusion. Its In re Longstaff '0 0 deci-
sion upheld the denial of naturalization to an alien who had lived in
the United States for 15 years on the grounds that he had never
been lawfully admitted to the country because he was a homosexual
and, therefore, was excludable as a psychopathic personality when
he entered. Longstaff argued that the psychopathic categorization
was a medical exclusion and that the only evidence an immigration
judge could consider was a PHS medical certificate. The court re-
jected this argument, noting that current INA procedure no longer
relied on medical certification; an alien's unsolicited, unambiguous
admission of homosexuality warranted exclusion.' 0 ' Thus, Long-
staff's statement that he was a homosexual at the time of his entry
was enough evidence to bar his naturalization.10 2 The court empha-
sized the plenary power of Congress to exclude aliens even for arbi-
trary or discriminatory reasons.' 03 According to the court, if such
policies resulted in injustice, then it was the duty of the legislature,
not the courts, to correct the injustice.' 0 4
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Tate adopted the rationale enunci-
ated by the Ninth Circuit in Hill, arguing:
Congress did so intend to treat medical causes for exclusion or depor-
tation differently from non-medical causes for denial of lawful admis-
sion to the United States, and ... we must respect the intended illogic
of Congress in according such talismanic significance to the presence
or absence of a conclusive medical certification as determinative of ad-
missibility or deportability. 105
Since the court in Hill and the majority in Longstaff interpreted
congressional intent for the same statute, yet reached different re-
sults, Congress has spoken ambiguously. 10 6 Either the Supreme
Court or Congress must resolve this ambiguity.
99. Hill v. I.N.S., 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
100. 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983). Although this decision involved a denial of nat-
uralization, it is discussed in this section because the essence of the decision concerned
issues related to admission.
101. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1451.
102. In re Longstaff 716 F.2d at 1451.
103. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1442, 1451.
104. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1451.
105. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1453 (Tate, J., dissenting).
106. Despite the fact that the courts in Hill and Longstaff arrived at opposite conclu-
sions, the practical consequences for homosexual aliens have remained unchanged.
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B. Uniform Interpretation of Immigration Statutes
Tension exists regarding the treatment of homosexuals in both
our society and our legal system. The above discussion illustrates
this tension: on two separate occasions the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
reached opposite results on two significant issues.10 7 The Fifth Cir-
cuit in Quiroz v. Neelly ruled that the phrase "psychopathic personali-
ties" was meant to include homosexuals; in contrast, the Ninth
Circuit in Fleuti v. Rosenberg found the phrase to be unconstitution-
ally vague. Twenty years later, in In re Longstaff, the Fifth Circuit held
that an alien's unsolicited, unambiguous admission of homosexual-
ity warrants that alien's exclusion; the Ninth Circuit, on the other
hand, ruled in Hill v. LN.S. that an alien could not be excluded with-
out a medical certificate issued by the PHS. Because these issues
concern immigration policy and the control of our borders, imple-
mentation of a uniform national policy is imperative. Immigration
policy is not something to be left to regional concerns. If it were,
our borders could resemble a large sieve where an alien excluded at
one location on the border could be admitted at another. Mobility
facilitated by modern means of transportation would certainly per-
mit the alien to reach his or her original destination in contraven-
tion of that jurisdiction's immigration policy, thereby undermining
this nation's entire immigration system.
To prevent such an occurrence, the United States Supreme Court
must resolve the Hill/Longstaff conflict.' 0 8 More importantly, the
Court should reexamine section 212(a) of the INA and determine
Although the government did not appeal the Hill decision to the United States Supreme
Court, it took action through the Attorney General's office. In a letter dated April 5,
1984, the Acting Deputy Attorney General instructed the Assistant Secretary for Health
in the Department of Health and Human Services to institute a new policy for the PHS
in the region of the Ninth Circuit. The letter stated that the INS had a congressionally
mandated duty to exclude self-proclaimed homosexuals. 61 Interpreter Releases 374,
377-78 (1984). Pursuant to this responsibility, within the Ninth Circuit the PHS is re-
quired to issue certificates to self-proclaimed homosexuals who are referred to the PHS
for an examination. Id. at 378. Thus, the trend toward liberalization of the policy for
entry of homosexuals into the United States has been effectively circumvented by this
revision.
107. See Quiroz v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1961); but see Fleuti v. Rosenberg,
302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
See Hill v. I.N.S., 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983); but see In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439
(5th Cir. 1983).
108. The Supreme Court refused the opportunity to resolve the conflict. In Long-
staff, a petition for certiorari was filed on the single issue of whether an alien's admission
of homosexual activity was statutorily and constitutionally sufficient to support a finding
that he was excludable under section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982), de-
spite the absence of the PHS medical examination and certification required by Con-
gress under section 234 of the Act. The petition was denied. 467 U.S. 1219 (1984).
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congressional intent regarding the exclusion of homosexual aliens.
This reexamination would require a reconsideration of the Boutilier
decision. Even though Boutilier is settled law, prevailing views of the
medical profession suggest that the decision deserves rethinking.
Policy considerations suggest that the Court should resolve the
conflict between the circuits and reinterpret our immigration stat-
ute. The significance of having a uniform rule is perhaps best ar-
ticulated by one commentator:
Both Judge Rubin (writing for the majority) and Judge Tate (dissent-
ing) in Longstaff recognize that Congress could act to clarify its current
intent in light of changes in medical and ethical thinking since
1965.... But it is not easy to get a legislature to take up such a con-
troversial topic. The majority and minority in Longstaff essentially dif-
fer, then, only as to what rule should prevail in the meantime, until
Congress chooses to legislate anew (if it ever does). Or to put the
matter another way, they differ over which side in the ongoing policy
debate over exclusion of homosexuals should bear the burden of over-
coming legislative inertia-and which side's views will be implemented
in default of new congressional action.' 09
Until some external force, either public outcry or judicial pro-
nouncement, provides the impetus for Congress to reexamine the
statute, lower courts will continue to issue their own contradictory
interpretations of the law.
C. Resolving the Conflicting Interpretations
The first split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits arose over the
meaning of "psychopathic personality." In 1961, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit held that the clear intent of Congress was
to exclude homosexuals. Judge Jones wrote:
We find it unnecessary 'to embark ... on an amateur's voyage on the
fog-enshrouded sea of psychiatry.' . . . The legislative history is clear
as to the meaning to be given to [the phrase 'psychopathic personal-
ity'] .... Whatever the phrase. . . may mean to the psychiatrist, to the
Congress it was intended to include homosexuals and sex perverts. It
is that intent which controls here.1 0
Shortly thereafter, however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit found Congressional intent much less discernible. Judge
Hamley wrote:
The conclusion is inescapable that the statutory term 'psychopathic
personality,' when measured by common understanding and practices,
109. T. Aleinikoff& D. Martin, supra note 1, at 231.
110. Quiroz v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906, 907 (5th Cir. 1961) (citing United States v.
Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405, 412 (2nd Cir. 1956)).
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does not convey sufficiently definite warning that homosexuality and
sex perversion are embraced therein. Since the statutory term thus
fails to meet the test to be applied in determining whether a statute is
vague in the constitutional sense, we hold that the statute is void for
vagueness. 1
In addressing this issue in Boutilier, the Supreme Court adopted
the Fifth Circuit view that Congress intended "psychopathic person-
ality" to include homosexuality." 2 The Court also rejected the
Ninth Circuit's void for vagueness argument, asserting that with re-
gard to behavior engaged in prior to entry into the United States,
Congress's plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens
was not subject to any constitutional requirement of fair warning."t 3
There was no indirection in the Boutilier decision. It candidly and
cogently affirmed what it considered to be the legislative intent of
section 212(a)(4) of the INA. Precisely because the Court avoided
niceties and technicalities in its opinion, the ruling has weathered
two decades of revolutionary change in this nation's perception of
homosexuality. Nonetheless, social values and psychiatric theories
have rendered the Boutilier interpretation of the INA obsolete.
While it appears that Congress clearly intended to place homo-
sexuals in the category of persons afflicted with psychopathic condi-
tions and subject them to the exclusions set out in section 212(a)(4),
the notion that "psychopathic personality" encompasses homosexu-
ality has become outdated. The medical profession has repudiated
the belief that homosexuality is a mental disorder; therefore, the in-
terpretation that homosexuals should be excluded on the ground of
their "psychopathic personality" is obsolete and must be reexam-
ined by the courts.
This cannot be done, however, without concluding that the con-
gressional purpose effectuated in section 212(a)(4) is to exclude
only those aliens with mental disorders. The courts must decide
that the controlling question for an INS officer when admitting an
alien is whether the alien is afflicted with any of the numerous
mental conditions set out in section 212(a)(4), not whether he or
she is a homosexual. In other words, the courts must decide
whether the terms "psychopathic personality" and "sexual
11. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
112. The Court relied on legislative history, especially S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1952), in finding that "the Act indicates beyond a shadow of a doubt that the
Congress intended the phrase 'psychopathic personality' to include homosexu-
als .... "Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 120.
113. Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 123.
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deviation" describe excludable medical conditions that require cer-
tification by medical personnel.
This was precisely the issue confronting the courts in Hill and
Longstaff. An examination of the legislative history of section
212(a)(4) indicates that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation is more
accurate than that of the Fifth Circuit. Congress explicitly relied on
the PHS to define "psychopathic personality" when it adopted the
term in 1952.114 Congress again relied on the medical knowledge of
the PHS when it added the term "sexual deviation" to section
212(a)(4) in 1965." t5
At the time Boutilier was decided, the PHS still considered homo-
sexuality a mental disorder. Accordingly, the Supreme Court cor-
rectly inferred that Congress intended to exclude homosexuals as
"psychopathic personalities." Congressional intent, however, was
premised on existing medical knowledge; nothing indicates that
Congress sought to exclude homosexuals on grounds of moral or
religious principles. Therefore, "[i]t seems somewhat inconsistent
... [to maintain] that when Congress included homosexuality within
the term 'psychopathic personality' in explicit reliance on PHS med-
ical advice, it intended to preclude the PHS from redefining that
term in light of new medical knowledge."" t6 When the PHS de-
cided in 1979 that it would no longer classify homosexuality as a
mental disorder, it could no longer logically be said that Congress
intended to exclude homosexuals." 7 Congress specifically dele-
gated the responsibility of determining the medical fitness of aliens
seeking to enter the United States to the medical authorities, not to
untrained and unlicensed INS agents." 8 From this grant of author-
ity to the PHS to exercise its expert discretion, it is logical to infer
that the PHS also has the authority to determine as a matter of med-
ical opinion to whom the statutorily excludable conditions apply.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit correctly held that medical certification
114. "The report that accompanied [H.R. 5678] shows clearly that the House judici-
ary Committee adopted the recommendation of the Public Health Service that 'psycho-
pathic personality' should be used in the Act as a phrase that would exclude from
admission homosexuals and sex perverts. . . . It quoted at length, and specifically
adopted, the Public Health Service report which recommended that the term 'psycho-
pathic personality' be used to 'specify such types of pathologic behavior as homosexual-
ity and sexual perversion.' " Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 122.
115. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4).
116. Note, The Propriety of Denying Entry to Homosexual Aliens: Examining the
Public Health Service's Authority Over Medical Exclusions, 17 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 331,
357 (1984).
117. Id. at 355-57.
118. "The physical and mental examination of arriving aliens . . . shall be made by
medical officers of the United States Public Health Service .. " 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1982).
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is needed to exclude homosexual aliens. Judge Tate in his Longstaff
dissent provided a cogent rationale that supports the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion in Hill:
[INA § 134] provides that either medical officers of the Public Health
Service or civil surgeons employed by the United States 'shall' conduct
the physical and mental examination of all aliens suspected of being
medically excludable under [INA § 212(a)(1)-(5)] (thus including the
grounds of psychopathic personality and sexual deviation). These
medical personnel and surgeons are the only persons authorized by
the Act to certify the existence of 'any' medical condition permitting
exclusion.... Nonetheless, the majority concludes that Congress did
not intend for a medical certificate attesting to an individual's homo-
sexuality to be the only competent evidence for exclusion on the basis
of 'psychopathic personality' or 'sexual deviation.' To the contrary,
however, I do not believe that it is overly formalistic to find that Con-
gress did intend in its statutory scheme to require medical certification,
and only medical certification, of any 'medical' cause for exclusion." 19
The Hill/Longstaff conflict should be resolved in favor of the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation that Congress enacted the terms "psycho-
pathic personality" and "sexual deviation" to ban aliens on the basis
of medical exclusion, and not on the basis of sexual orientation.
This interpretation can be derived from Congress's reliance on gov-
ernment health authorities in writing the provisions, the specific del-
egation to the PHS of the broad authority to determine an alien's
health status for purposes of section 212(a)(4) exclusion, and the
express requirement of section 234 that aliens excludable under
section 212(a) be examined by PHS health officials. Having con-
cluded that the excludable conditions named in section 212(a) are
medically based, the Court should announce that terms such as
"psychopathic personality" and "sexual deviation" no longer apply
to homosexuals per se. If Congress intended that all homosexual
aliens be denied entry into the United States, as the Justice Depart-
ment insists, then under its current practice of interrogating or ex-
amining only aliens who make unsolicited, unambiguous admissions
of homosexuality, the INS is failing to effectuate the will of
Congress.120
D. The Role of Congress
In 1984, the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari in the
Longstaff case. It is uncertain whether and when the Court will have
119. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1452 (5th Cir. 1983) (Tate, J., dissenting).
120. Fowler & Graff, Gay Aliens and Immigration: Resolving the Conflict Between
Hill and Longstaff, 10 U. Dayton L. Rev. 621, 631 n.74 (1985).
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another opportunity to reconcile the split between the circuits. In
the meantime, Congress must confront the issue, and should per-
haps be guided by the words of an administrative law judge in the
Hill case who stated:
the homosexual per se, is neither a socially dangerous psychopath nor a
sick person afflicted with a dread disease. The conclusion to be
reached therefore is that some 28 years ago Congress mislabeled ho-
mosexuality as a psychiatric condition by means of a statute.' 2 '
Changes in attitudes and medical developments in the past two
decades warrant a reexamination of the statute. The medical com-
munity no longer considers. homosexuality to be a mental disorder.
Some religions are relaxing their condemnations of homosexual-
ity. 12 2 Gay political leaders, athletes, entertainers, and clergymen
are openly admitting their lifestyles without shame.' 2 3 Whether
Congress intended to exclude homosexuals on medical or moral
grounds, the basis and rationale of the statute must be reexamined
in light of these recent developments. Inferring congressional in-
tent to incorporate a per se exclusion of homosexuals into the cur-
rent immigration statute ignores the changes in societal mores and
threatens to reverse the trend of civil rights advancement achieved
by other minority groups.
In spite of this, Congress might enact a new statute that would
exclude homosexual aliens as an attempt to limit the spread of
AIDS. The following section discusses AIDS and the impact it has
had upon our immigration policy. It offers some suggestions about
how Congress and the courts can establish a coherent policy regard-
ing homosexual immigration in light of the serious and legitimate
fears surrounding the AIDS epidemic.
IV AIDS and Immigration Law
"When a society is threatened by an outbreak of a contagious dis-
ease, a conflict arises between the interests of the sick and the well.
121. National Lawyers Guild, Sexual Orientation and the Law 7-7 n.27 (1987) (citing
Hill v. I.N.S., A.LJ. Decision of Nov. 7, 1980).
122. "Although slower to respond to the new libertarian movement, some church
groups have eased their condemnation of homosexuals as persons. The Episcopal
Church has ordained homosexual ministers, both male and female; Presbyterians, Uni-
tarians and Methodists have allowed gay ministers; and organizations of homosexuals
have been functioning within the Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Anglican, Protes-
tant and Jewish religions." 2 Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, Homosexuality and
Crime 870-72 (1983).
123. Id. at 872.
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The ill seek care and a cure; the healthy want protection from expo-
sure to the disease."' 24 Because of the AIDS epidemic, Americans
are torn between the fear for the safety, health, and welfare of the
unafflicted and sympathy for those who have contracted the disease.
The result has been a self-protective policy to exclude any immi-
grant afflicted with AIDS. 125
A. Excluding Aliens with Contagious Diseases
Congress first barred immigrants for medical reasons in 1879 pur-
suant to the statute entitled "An Act to prevent the introduction of
infectious or contagious diseases into the United States and to es-
tablish a National Board of Health."' 26 This congressional action
had two objectives: first, to prevent immigrants with severe ailments
from economically burdening American citizens; and second, to
protect the health and welfare of United States citizens from disease
carriers.
Several months after its enactment, the 1879 Act was refined to
address issues of scope and procedure. Primarily, the revision de-
fined contagious or infectious diseases to include Asiatic cholera,
yellow fever, plague, small pox, typhus fever, and relapsing fever. 127
Furthermore, the Act authorized the President to appoint a medical
officer at various foreign ports to inspect all vessels and crew bound
for the United States. Shore leave was denied to anyone found in-
fected with one of the enumerated diseases.' 28
On March 3, 1891, Congress passed a new law denying entry to
those suffering from "loathsome or dangerous" contagious dis-
eases. 129 This statute raised the level of physical ailment that consti-
tuted a barrier to entry from infectiousness to dangerousness. 30
The change could be attributed to the advancement in medical tech-
nology and the ability of the medical profession to cope with the
124. Note, Characterization and Disease: Homosexuals and the Threat of AIDS, 66
N.C.L. Rev. 226, 226-27 (1987).
125. 42 C.F.R. § 34.4 (1987); Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6) (1987).
126. Ch. 202, 20 Stat. 484 (1879).
127. Druhot, Immigration Laws Excluding Aliens on the Basis of Health: A Reas-
sessment After AIDS, 7J. Legal Med. 85, 88 (1986).
128. Id. at 88 nn.23-24 (citing T. Turner, Some Remarks Upon National and Inter-
national Sanctuary Jurisprudence 35 app. X (1881)).
129. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084. Other aliens excluded were
idiots, the insane, and persons likely to become public charges. Id.
130. Additionally, the Act of 1891 prohibited transportation companies from at-
tempting to bring aliens to this country if the immigrants had statutorily excludable
diseases. 22 Op. Att'y Gen. 122 (1898).
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simpler infectious diseases. More than 50 years then passed without
another significant revision of this portion of United States immigra-
tion law. 13 '
On June 27, 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (INA) over a presidential veto.' 3 2 The pertinent provisions
of this act mandated that aliens afflicted with tuberculosis or any
dangerous contagious disease be excluded. 33 In 1961, Congress
streamlined this category by providing for the exclusion of aliens
"afflicted with any dangerous contagious disease."' 34 This phrase
was redefined to include only the more severe forms of leprosy and
tuberculosis.' 3 5 That revision demonstrated awareness of medical
advancements by leaving as excludable only those forms of diseases
that were incurable or too costly to be cured. Since 1961, Congress
has added more ailments to section 212(a). They are chancroid,
gonorrhea, granuloma inguinale, human immunodeficiency virus,
lymphogranuloma venereum, infectious syphilis, infectious leprosy,
and active tuberculosis.136 Thus, Congress has consistently ad-
vanced the viewpoint that aliens will be permitted entry, provided
they do not financially burden or. endanger the health and welfare of
the American public.
B. AIDS as a Contagious Disease
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is a disease caused
by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). 13 7 HIV infects and
destroys the white blood cells, a central component of the body's
immune system, resulting in a lowered immunity to diseases and in-
fections that do not normally affect healthy people. 3 8 Although
131. Between 1891 and 1952 additional changes in immigration laws based on medi-
cal reasons occurred, including in 1903 the addition of epileptics to the class of excluda-
ble aliens. See Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214.
132. McCarran-Walter Act, ch. 477, tit. 1, § 101, 66 Stat. 166 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982)).
133. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6), (g) (1952). Medical exclusions also existed for individu-
als who were categorized as feebleminded; insane; suffering from one or more attacks of
insanity; suffering from a physical defect that would affect their ability to earn a living;
being afflicted with a psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or mental defect; and being
narcotic drug addicts or chronic alcoholics. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(7), (23) (1952).
134. Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 11, 75 Stat. 650, 654 (1961) (codified at 8 U.S.C
§ 1182(a)(6) (1964)).
135. 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b)(5) (1986) (listing infectious leprosy); 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b)(8)
(1986) (listing active tuberculosis).
136. 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b) (1987).
137. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Understanding AIDS: A Message from
the Surgeon General (1988).
138. Comment, supra note 41, at 126-27. A diagnosis of AIDS is made when an
individual is infected with HIV, has a damaged immune system, and either has particular
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individuals infected with HIV may have none of the symptoms typi-
cally associated with AIDS victims, they are still capable of transmit-
ting the virus.
HIV is a deadly virus, but it is difficult to spread. It can only be
transmitted by the introduction of certain bodily fluids of an -in-
fected individual into the bloodstream of another; modes of trans-
mission include unprotected sexual intercourse with an infected
individual, sharing hypodermic needles with an individual infected
with HIV, transfusion of blood contaminated with HIV, and trans-
mission from an infected mother to her fetus.' 39 Because of the
modes of transmission, the epidemiological pattern in the United
States shows that certain groups of individuals have a higher inci-
dence of HIV infection. Those groups are gay and bisexual men,
intravenous drug users, hemophiliacs, and recipients of blood trans-
fusions between the years of approximately 1981-1985.140 How-
ever, individuals of every race, age, gender, and sexual orientation
are susceptible to the virus.
In 1986, five years after the identification of AIDS, Dr. Otis
Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services, submitted the first
proposal to list AIDS as a dangerous contagious disease.' 4 1 On
June 5, 1987, the PHS revised this proposal by deleting AIDS from
the list of dangerous contagious diseases and adding HIV infec-
tion.1 42 The purpose of this revision was to effect a broader exclu-
sion by barring any alien who is infected with HIV, and therefore is
capable of transmitting the AIDS virus, whether or not that person
has the clinical manifestations of AIDS. On August 28, 1987, HIV
was added to the list of dangerous contagious diseases.' 43
The inclusion of HIV as a dangerous contagious disease presents
a justifiable basis for excluding an alien afflicted with the virus.
Since HIV is the cause of AIDS, the virus is dangerous by its very
nature. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) estimates that over
1,500,000 Americans have already been exposed to the virus, and of
those, 270,000 will develop the disease by 1991.144 Furthermore,
an estimated two to three million Americans will become infected
opportunistic diseases, suffers from a "wasting syndrome," or has a certain nervous sys-
tem infection.
139. Id.
140. Id. 90% of all AIDS cases in the United States are attributable to these catego-
ries of individuals.
141. Id. at 121.
142. 52 Fed. Reg. 21,532 (1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 21,607 (1987).
143. 52 Fed. Reg. 32,543 (1987) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b)(4) (1987)).
144. See Note, supra note 124, at 244.
224
Vol. 7:201, 1989
Exclusion of Homosexual Aliens
with AIDS by 1995; this figure represents approximately 1% of our
nation's population. 14 5 Unless a cure for AIDS is found, 14 6 most of
these individuals will die from it. 14 7
Moreover, the complexity of the AIDS problem stems from the
fact that few AIDS victims realize they are infected with the disease
during the virus's incubation period; nonetheless, they can transmit
the virus during this stage. The victims' ignorance coupled with the
fact that common manners of transmission are through sexual activ-
ity and drug usage, activities prevalent in our society, make it ex-
tremely difficult to control the spread of the disease.
The unfortunate impact of AIDS necessitates the exclusion of
aliens infected with HIV. In response to the incorporation of HIV
as a dangerous contagious disease, the Public Health Service estab-
lished a formal set of guidelines regarding the medical examination
of aliens. The examination focuses on the mental and physical con-
dition of the alien.
First, a general physical exam is required for all aliens regardless
of age. A body surface inspection is performed to uncover signs of
overt diseases such as tuberculosis and leprosy. During the exami-
nation, the physician notes any observable mental or physical de-
fects of the alien. 148 Second, all aliens 15 years of age and older
receive a chest x-ray for tuberculosis and a serologic test for syphilis
and HIV. Persons subject to chest x-ray and serologic exam include
all applicants for immigration visas, students and exchange visitors
and others applying for nonimmigration visas, and all aliens apply-
ing for conditional entry. For individuals under 15 years of age
neither test will be required unless the INS officer has reason to sus-
pect an infection of tuberculosis, syphilis, or HIV. 149
The entire medical examination is generally conducted in the
country where the applicant's visa is processed rather than in the
United States. In certain circumstances, refugees with proper ap-
proval from the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the
145. See Comment, supra note 41, at 120. Before an AIDS case is reported, as many
as 50-100 people may have been infected. Heise, AIDS: New Threat to the Third
World, Worldwatch, Jan./Feb. 1988, at 19.
146. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., supra note 137, at 5. Presently there is
no cure for AIDS. Medicines such as AZT merely prolong the lives of some people with
AIDS. Id.
147. See Comment, supra note 41, at 127.
148. See Druhot, supra note 127, at 95-96.
149. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(2) (1987).
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Secretary of Health and Human Services, may be serologically
tested in the United States.1 50
Absent HIV screening, the United States faces greater medical
costs, more loss of life, and greater risk of contagion.1 5 ' However,
this exclusion does not and should not in any way change present
immigration policy that permits aliens afflicted with AIDS to come
to the United States on a temporary basis for medical care and treat-
ment.1 52  Such a policy is consistent with the humanitarian goals
that our society attempts to further.
C. Homosexuals and AIDS
The fact that the first recorded cases of AIDS in the United States
occurred in homosexual men has affected the entire public percep-
tion of the disease.' 53 Because the public perceives AIDS as "the
gay man's disease,"' 54 the homosexual community has become the
target of homophobic reactions.155 Moreover, the fact that a major-
ity of AIDS victims are homosexual men reinforces the public per-
ception of AIDS as a homosexual affliction. 156
Unfortunately, characterizing AIDS as a gay man's disease con-
fuses the issue of the legal rights of homosexuals with the separate
but equally important question of the limits and restrictions that
150. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(3) (1987); see also 65 Interpreter Releases 569 (1988)
(cable sent to all U.S. diplomatic and consular offices overseas informing them of
policy).
151. Between 1892 and 1983 over 82,500 aliens were excluded from the United
States due to health-related defects, and an additional 219,418 were excluded as likely to
become public charges. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service 193 (1983). Despite the efficiency of the INS in discovering
medically excludable handicaps, difficulties in testing procedures exist, particularly in
the context of AIDS. Since the incubation period for the HIV virus is six months to
seven years, individuals may test negative for HIV even though they are infected with
the virus. Also, the test does result in positive results for some people who do not have
the HIV virus. Thus, the test for HIV is not completely reliable. See Comment, supra
note 41, at 128.
152. See 52 Fed. Reg. 21,532 (1987). The final rule on AIDS will not interfere with
the ability of an alien with AIDS who seeks medical care in the United States to receive a
nonimmigrant (temporary) visa under the authority of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1987).
153. See Note, supra note 124, at 231.
154. Id. at 237.
155. Id. at 237. A study of violence against homosexuals in eight cities showed that
20% of gay men had been the victim of physical assaults and that in at least 8% of the
reported incidents, the assailants allegedly mentioned AIDS. Id. at 238. "According to
gay-rights groups, hate-motivation assaults have tripled in recent years." As one group
assesses the situation, "AIDS has provided a green light to the bashers and the bigots."
Open Season on Gays: AIDS Sparks an Epidemic of Violence Against Homosexuals,
Time, Mar. 7, 1988, at 24.
156. See Note, supra note 124.
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should be imposed on individuals infected with HIV. In creating
and upholding restrictions to prevent further transmission of the
disease, legislators and judges must be aware of the attempts to at-
tack the gay community through restrictions cloaked as public
health measures.' 57 Indeed, gay rights activists are concerned that
AIDS testing will be misused to discriminate against aliens who are
members of groups with a high risk of contracting the disease, in
addition to those aliens who actually test positive for HIV. 158
What does all this mean at the border? Current regulations make
it clear that all immigrants, homosexual and heterosexual, are re-
quired to be serologically tested for HIV.' 59 Given the existence of
such universal testing, there is no danger of discriminatory AIDS
testing of those whom the INS believes to be gay and no justifiable
reason for excluding gay men based on the fact that they are in a
high risk group.
Despite the fact that all aliens who apply for entry visas to the
United States are tested for HIV, however, the grim reality for ho-
mosexual aliens is that AIDS provides an additional reason on which
to base the exclusion of gay men. Despite the superficial appear-
ance of nondiscrimination, fear of AIDS may lead to the failure to
revise current INS policies regarding immigration of homosexuals
to comport with current medical understandings. Despite opposi-
tion from their medical advisors, INS officials will be able to con-
tinue denying gay aliens entry at the southern border under the
Fifth Circuit view, which upholds exclusions despite the absence of a
medical certificate.' 60 On the west coast, where the Ninth Circuit
has developed a more rational approach in requiring the INS to ob-
tain a medical certificate before the homosexual alien is barred, 16'
public opinion may force immigration officials to exclude homosex-
uals based on the fear that they are more likely to become infected
with AIDS.
157. See Note, supra note 124, at 238.
158. See Comment, supra note 41, at 129.
159. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. Serology refers to the science that
treats serums and their reactions and properties. Webster's Third New World Diction-
ary 2074 (1981).
160. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439.
161. Hill, 714 F.2d 1470.
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D. Toward a Coherent Policy
Congress must act to devise a rational and coherent immigration
policy regarding homosexual aliens. Laws and administrative prac-
tices that result in the exclusion of homosexual aliens as such must
be reexamined.
Congress should adopt an immigration policy that considers two
factors. First, the statute should dispense with all bigoted views re-
garding homosexuality. Homosexuals are not psychopaths or
mental defectives; rather, homosexuals, like other American citi-
zens, possess the talents and potential to make this nation great.
Therefore, there is no place in our immigration law for a per se ex-
clusion of homosexual aliens.
Second, the statute should take into consideration the AIDS prob-
lem. The law should provide for an exclusion of all immigrants af-
fected with HIV. However, the law should ensure that homosexual
aliens, once they have tested negative for HIV and have satisfied all
the other medical requirements for entry, will not be excluded.
Such a policy will strike a balance between the goals of diversity and
nondiscrimination and the need to protect the American people
from dangerous diseases.
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